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ABSTRACT: A decision by two Spanish companies to start producing nuclear-based electrical energy was the 
beginning of a journey that led two Spanish engineers to the United States and Canada in 1957. They wanted to 
learn about the reactor technology that North American companies were developing, contact specialized consult-
ants to explore possible consultancy services, and search out political, economic, and financial support to make 
their project viable. The trip’s travel log suggests that the route they set off on was decisive in convincing the dic-
tatorship’s political, industrial, and economic powers of the importance of nuclear energy; this journey had a direct 
influence on subsequent construction of Spanish nuclear facilities and on the policies designed to manage it. In 
this article I suggest exploring this journey and its record to reflect on how nuclear energy participated in building 
a new narrative on the Franco regime, one that showed Spain as a modern, internationally-connected State capable 
of incorporating the latest atomic technologies. 
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RESUMEN: Rutas y culturas atómicas para una nueva narrativa del franquismo. La decisión de dos empresas 
españolas de lanzarse a producir energía eléctrica de origen nuclear puso en marcha un viaje que llevó en 1957 a 
dos ingenieros españoles a Estados Unidos y Canadá. Querían conocer la tecnología de los reactores que las firmas 
norteamericanas estaban desarrollando, contactar con consultoras especializadas para sondear posibles asesorías y 
buscar apoyos políticos, económicos y financieros que hicieran viable su proyecto. El cuaderno que registró el via-
je sugiere que la ruta que emprendieron resultó determinante para convencer a los poderes políticos, industriales y 
económicos de la dictadura; tuvo un influjo directo en la posterior construcción del parque atómico español y en el 
diseño de las políticas que lo gestionaron. En este artículo propongo ese viaje y su registro para reflexionar sobre 
cómo la energía nuclear participó de la construcción de una nueva narrativa del franquismo que mostró a España 
como un Estado moderno, conectado internacionalmente y capaz de incorporar las últimas tecnologías atómicas.
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foreign technology – they did introduce changes that were 
soon perceived in speeches and autarkic policies of the 
Franco regime: It took little time for Spain and its elec-
trical industry to become the leading atomic partners for 
the Americans in Europe (Rubio Varas and De la Torre, 
2017).
But I want to go further in this article, to show the 
close connection between traveling, experimenting and 
gaining knowledge. In order to establish a more effective 
dialogue with other historians, I lay out the knowledge, 
experiences and desires this trip put into circulation, that 
‘knowledge in transit’ paraphrasing James A. Secord 
(2004), to suggest that Spain’s commitment to nuclear 
energy had a direct influence on the construction of a 
new narrative from the Franco regime, one that sought 
to show this country as a modern, internationally-con-
nected State capable of incorporating the latest atomic 
technologies.
I
Iberduero and Electra del Viesgo were the first Span-
ish electricity companies to make their desire to take a 
chance on nuclear energy public. The first company had 
a dominant position in the electricity market in northern 
Spain and Electra del Viesgo was the company responsi-
ble for supplying electricity to Santander (Garrués, 2006, 
pp. 497-573). 
Studies carried out in the mid-1950s by the Ministry 
of Industry, Iberduero and Electra del Viesgo forecast that 
an increase in energy demand in northern Spain was going 
to take place in the 1960s and 1970s. It was in this context 
that the two electricity companies began to assess the con-
struction of a nuclear power plant. But the technical and 
financial effort involved in the project made it unadvisa-
ble to be handled individually. This was when they chose 
to join forces and integrate their projects, which was the 
origin of Centrales Nucleares del Norte (Nuclenor, the 
Northern Nuclear Power Plants).
Although Nuclenor was the first to apply for permis-
sion from the Ministry of Industry, which they did in 
1958, to build Santa María de Garoña, this was the second 
nuclear power plant to be put into operation in Spain. The 
project presented in 1962 by Unión Eléctrica Madrileña 
got a head start on them—the Zorita nuclear power plant 
in Guadalajara began to operate in 1968—with a techni-
cally less-ambitious proposal that was designed to supply 
the center of the peninsula. The Ministry of Industry chose 
to show the virtue of prudence, arguing that the Zorita 
project was more feasible and less costly, and to treat the 
political will I suggest was behind this decision as second-
ary: to prioritize and strengthen the energy supply in the 
center of the peninsula as opposed to the north. This, even 
though various studies on energy needs had already stat-
ed, as we will see below, that there would be an increase 
in demand in the northern part of the peninsula. In this 
sense, prioritizing Zorita over Garoña can be interpreted 
as another way of strengthening and making visible the 
unique and centralized power of the Francoist State.
On September 22, 1971, Franco inaugurated the San-
ta María de Garoña nuclear power plant near Miranda de 
Ebro (Burgos). He was accompanied by the Ministers of 
Industry and Public Works, José María López de Letona 
and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, the Commissioner 
for Development Plans, Laureano López Rodó, and the 
Archbishop of the Diocese of Burgos. This was the cul-
mination of a project that had begun in 1957 when two 
Spanish electricity companies—Iberduero and Electra del 
Viesgo—decided to unite their plans, creating Nuclenor 
(Nucleares del Norte). The plan was to begin construction 
on a nuclear power plant that could supply an increase in 
demand for electricity that reports from experts in both 
companies and also from the Ministry of Industry esti-
mated would be created in northern Spain in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
Fourteen years passed from the start of the project to 
when the power plant was connected to the Spanish elec-
tricity network. During this time there were many books, 
reports, plans, people and major artifacts that traveled and 
circulated from one side of the Atlantic to the other. I have 
used as a source for this article the travel log that recorded 
the trips and impressions from the journey made by the 
two engineers, Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines and Francisco 
Albisu, to the United States and Canada in 1957.1 This 
log is a material scientific object that had its own agency 
in the construction of Spanish atomic knowledge, and I 
propose it should also be read as a political and diplomatic 
object that had an influence on policy changes from the 
Franco regime, beginning with the Stabilization Plan of 
1959.
Throughout history, generally, and in the history of sci-
ence and technology, in particular, journeys have played a 
leading role in the construction of knowledge. The close 
connection between traveling, experimenting, and gain-
ing knowledge, which is so nicely suggested in works on 
scientific expeditions (Pimentel, 2003; Bleichmar, 2012) 
or those reflecting on journeys for training and extend-
ed studies (Santesmases, 2007; López-Ocón, Guijarro, 
Pedrazuela, 2018; Velasco Morgado, 2019), have been a 
great inspiration in this work. And others have as well, 
such as works arguing that not all knowledge travels well 
in texts and that experimental practice is also necessary 
(Daston, 2000; Bud, 2007) and those that have shown the 
role that scientific artifacts have also played in political 
and diplomatic negotiations (Romero de Pablos, 2019a). 
All of them open up an interesting historiographic space 
to reflect not only on the direct influence this journey and 
its materialities had on the construction of Spanish nucle-
ar facilities but also on the standing they provided to con-
struct a new geopolitical narrative on the Franco regime, 
another of this article’s proposals. 
This journey, like so many others, showed Spain’s in-
tention to change and its desire for integration into the 
Western bloc.2 Although support for North American 
atomic policies and the expansion of its industry into 
Spanish territory was not viewed favorably by all – there 
were endless debates between supporters of encouraging 
development of the national industry versus purchasing 
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In order to really understand Nuclenor’s commitment, 
it needs to be put in dialogue with a certain euphoria and 
what John Krige (2010) called ‘the education of desire’ 
for nuclear culture, which had produced the first Interna-
tional Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
held in Geneva in August 1955. A large group of Span-
ish politicians and industrialists participated in this, and 
Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines, then managing director of 
Electra del Viesgo, was one of them (Romero de Pablos, 
2018a). The large body of work done on this conference 
from the history of science, political history, the history of 
diplomacy and history of communication show the impact 
and significance it had on later development of this new 
form of energy (Medhurst, 1997; Krige, 2006; Osgood, 
2006; Zachmann, 2011; Mateos and Suárez-Díaz, 2015; 
Drogan, 2016). 
The new forms of international cooperation that the 
first Geneva Conference helped to launch turned science 
and technology, in general, and atomic energy, in particu-
lar, into political and diplomatic agents. And Nuclenor’s 
leaders understood this when, in 1957, they decided to 
consider producing energy from nuclear sources. They 
knew from the beginning they had to convince, and not 
only within Spain, the various actors – political, finan-
cial and social – about the opportuneness of the project 
they were looking to begin. Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines, 
then the newly appointed Vice President and CEO of this 
new entity, was aware of the doubts existing about reactor 
technology, how it worked and, above all, its profitability. 
That is why, when they began to think about how to deal 
with this ambitious project, it was clear to Gutiérrez-Cor-
tines that they had to travel to learn about the various test-
ing and projects that other countries had already begun. 
It was, in his view, the only way to make the right choice 
in regard to the type of reactor that best suited Nuclenor’s 
energy and economic needs.
This was the origin of a trip that although initially 
aimed at learning about the different testing and projects 
that American and Canadian companies were undertak-
ing, also served to provide arguments and reinforce Span-
ish technocrats who thought that economic growth should 
be based on the country’s industrialization and moderni-
zation (Delgado, 2015). 
When on October 30, 1957, a few months after es-
tablishing the partnership, Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines and 
Francisco Albisu began their journey, it was not long until 
the National Trade Union Economic Council would talk 
about, at its annual meeting in December 1957, the urgent 
need to exploit nuclear energy industrially in Spain. They 
were a little more than a year ahead of the Minister of 
Industry, Joaquín Planell, who took up this issue again in 
the Spanish Parliament in his speech presenting the Law 
on Investigation and Exploitation of Radioactive Materi-
als.3 And two more years passed before Franco and his 
government, through the Stabilization Plan of 1959, pro-
tected and promoted trade and financial exchanges with 
the outside world by introducing more permissive legis-
lation that was open to foreign investment (Carreras and 
Tafunell, 2007). 
As such, I propose that this trip played a part in con-
structing this new national and international narrative, 
which as of the 1960s showed the Francoist State as an in-
ternationally connected State capable of incorporating the 
latest atomic technologies. (On the participation of certain 
groups of engineers in some of the political and economic 
transformations that took place during the Franco regime, 
see Camprubí, 2017; for the specific case of nuclear de-
velopment, Chapter 9).
The trip brought together two engineers coming from 
different generations and with different career paths. Ma-
nuel Gutiérrez-Cortines, trained at the Faculty of Industri-
al Engineers in Madrid, brought experience in electricity 
companies with him when he joined Electra del Viesgo 
in 1941 as managing director: he had worked at Standard 
Eléctrica since 1925, where he became general director 
and president of its Portuguese subsidiary in 1935. Fran-
cisco Albisu was also an industrial engineer but had been 
trained at the Faculty of Engineering in Bilbao. His early 
work was developed at the Laboratory of Industrial Re-
search and Testing (LABEIN), which had been promoted 
in 1955 by Leandro José de Torróntegui, one of the Span-
ish industrialists who had also attended the first Geneva 
Conference (Urdangarín, 2018). In 1956, Albisu enrolled 
in the first Introduction to Nuclear Engineering course 
taught in Spain. Organized by the Theoretical Physics 
and Reactor Calculation Division of the Nuclear Energy 
Board (JEN in its Spanish acronym), it was the first to 
offer students hands-on practice with a Van der Graaff 
accelerator and a Cockroft-Walton neutron accelerator 
(Barca, 2000, p. 39; Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, 
2001, pp. 126 and 127)4. Following this course, in Sep-
tember 1956 he traveled to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) where he did a Master of Science in 
Nuclear Engineering (Rubio-Varas and de la Torre, 2018, 
pp. 101 and 102). So, when Gutiérrez-Cortines comment-
ed to Leandro José de Torróntegui on his willingness to 
travel to the United States and the trip’s objectives, the lat-
ter suggested that Francisco Albisu, young, well-trained 
and knowledgeable about the North American industry, 
would be an excellent traveling companion.5
As the Spanish engineers were fully aware of the hybrid 
and easily-permeated space they would be dealing with, 
they decided that in order to contrast the varied, certainly 
self-interested, information they were going to receive, they 
would combine visits to different research centers, con-
struction companies, and nuclear installations with meet-
ings with North American atomic policy decision-makers, 
leading engineering consultants and managers of North 
American industrial banks; they also wanted to evaluate 
possible economic and financial support for the project.
The account of the trip that began October 30 and 
ended on November 22 shows that the Spanish engi-
neers were aware of the problems they had to face and 
not at all complacent about the facilities they visited or 
the interlocutors who received them. The many techni-
cal and organizational issues the North American in-
dustry still had pending to resolve were also noted in 
the travel log.
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Although reactor models such as the Soviet RBMK 
and Canadian CANDU were already in operation at the 
end of the 1950s (Marcus, 2010, pp. 110 and 111, 184 
and 185) and other types of reactors were under study, 
only two technologies had achieved an optimal degree of 
development globally for large-scale production of nu-
clear-derived electrical energy. The first, developed in the 
United States, was based on two reactor types, the pres-
surized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor 
(BWR) (Marcus, 2010, pp. 99-101 and 104-106). What 
both have in common is that they use slightly enriched 
uranium as fuel and are cooled and moderated by water. 
But they differ in that in the second case the reactor cool-
ant circuit is separated from the water-steam circuit by 
steam generators. This arrangement, although more ex-
pensive, prevents the heaters and condenser from being 
within the area exposed to radiation. And the second tech-
nology that was already on the market in the late 1950s 
were the natural uranium reactors, with graphite and gas, 
developed in Great Britain and France, known as MAG-
NOX and UNGG, respectively. These reactors used natu-
ral uranium as fuel, graphite as the moderator, and carbon 
dioxide gas as the heat exchange coolant (Marcus, 2010, 
pp. 130-132).
In the first two power plants installed in Spain, the 
North American technology was chosen: Zorita with the 
PWR type and Garoña with the BWR. In the third, Van-
dellòs opted for French technology (UNGG). In the rest 
of the Spanish nuclear facilities, North American technol-
ogy dominated with PWR reactors being the majority, the 
exception being Trillo, which would incorporate German 
technology in the 1980s. (To learn about the technology 
used in each of the Spanish nuclear power plants see Ru-
bio Varas and De la Torre, 2017, pp. 250-254).
The interest of Nuclenor’s engineers in learning about 
the different types of reactors the nuclear industry and 
North American national laboratories were working on 
led them to visit the Argonne National Laboratory in 
Chicago first. This laboratory, which had been formally 
opened in 1946, originated from the “Manhattan Project,” 
a project led by the United States and backed by the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Canada which had built the first nuclear 
bombs during World War II. (For the history of this labo-
ratory see Holl, Hewlett and Harris, 1997; for the Manhat-
tan Project see Reed, 2014). There, the Spanish engineers 
had their first contact with research reactors—the AER-
OJET and ARGONAUT models (Nuclear Assembly for 
University Training)—and with a type of boiling water 
power reactor. 
They were interested in knowing the scope of the re-
search reactors because they were considering the possi-
bility of installing these types of reactors to train students 
both in the Faculty of Industrial Engineering in Bilbao and 
in Barcelona. Cortines and Albisu saw both of the mod-
els in operation and had access to the complete collec-
tion of drawings and plans for each one. Even so, before 
travelling they had learned about the Report AML-5704. 
ARGONAUT, Argonne’s Nuclear Assembly for Universi-
ty Training, which included a simplified edition of these 
plans. Seeing both reactors working gave them skills and 
knowledge that would be difficult to extract from any re-
port, no matter how complete.6 This information, together 
with on-site experience in the laboratory, convinced them 
that the ARGONAUT reactor offered more possibilities 
and would be more useful to them in training future en-
gineers. Furthermore, having a set of drawings with cal-
culations and how to assemble the parts would facilitate 
possible construction and replication of this type of reac-
tor in Spain.
But the record of the visit shows that the engineers 
from Nuclenor knew that, in order to replicate a reactor 
of this type in Spain, they had to take an interest in other 
details that went beyond the reactor’s performance and its 
suitability for research and teaching:
We visited the ARGONAUT. The building is of a nor-
mal type of about 12x20 meters of floor space and with a 
height of about seven meters. The reactor is at one end, it 
does not need an exclusion zone (…). A simple jib crane 
was installed because it is cheaper, but they think that, if 
possible, an overhead crane can be installed. The concrete 
blocks for shielding are loose to make it easier to move 
them around. There are no warning signals in the build-
ing. Mr. Bryant [Harry Bryant, one of the physicists who 
accompanied them on the visit] says training is very good 
with this reactor. You can start by building the subcritical 
reactor and then continue until the entire reactor is com-
plete. He insists that maturity in this field is achieved by 
learning while doing things. The control panel is similar 
to the one in a large power plant. The reactor is inher-
ently safe; there are no wastewater problems (…). THE 
ARGONAUT is much more flexible than the AEROJET. 
Many things can be modified. Many accessories, thermal 
columns, etc., can be added to it.7
The Argos and Arbi reactors that were finally built in 
the JEN and installed in the Faculty of Engineering both in 
Bilbao and Barcelona, respectively, in 1961 demonstrated 
and convinced those responsible for the Spanish nuclear 
industry and policies that the transfer of knowledge and 
practices between the North American and Spanish lab-
oratories was possible (for a technical report on the con-
struction of these reactors see Fernández Palomero, Álva-
rez del Buergo and Sostoa Esquiroz, 1959: 18-37; Albisu 
and Echevarría, 1963). 
The first power reactor that Cortines and Albisu saw 
was also at the Argonne National Laboratory, where they 
had installed a 5 MW BWR reactor. They knew this tech-
nology had been the focus of attention a year earlier at the 
Atomic Industrial Forum meetings;8 and they also knew 
of the growing interest it was raising to the detriment 
of PWR reactors, until then the figurehead of the North 
American power reactor industry. This visit, along with a 
previous conversation they had upon their arrival in New 
York with an engineer at General Electric who had spo-
ken to them about the advantages of BWR reactors, put 
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them in a situation that would be constantly repeated for 
the rest of the trip, and which shows the fragile border 
between knowledge, technological information, and eco-
nomic and industrial interests: General Electric had opted 
for development of BWR reactors, so the comments and 
assessments made by this engineer were always going to 
be mediated by that decision. 
For the Spanish engineers, as important as knowing 
the reactors’ technical details and seeing them operate 
was seeing that the supposed technological advantages 
that some types of reactors had for certain people were 
not so advantageous for others. So Cortines and Albisu 
also tried to find out what opinion the North American 
electricity companies were having about the new nuclear 
technology.
Commonwealth Edison, one of Chicago’s leading 
electricity producers, was the first electricity company 
they visited. This company had been one of the first to 
trust the BWR reactors built by General Electric. Accord-
ing to what the Spaniards wrote in their travel log, for 
the Chicago electricity company this technology was the 
most reliable and General Electric the best company to 
build it: “If there is any type of reactor that presents a 
favorable outlook so far it is the boiling water and GE 
(sic) is the best organization to build it”9. An assessment 
that, contextualized in the time it was expressed, acquires 
a meaning that goes beyond an exclusively technical eval-
uation. When the technicians at Commonwealth Edison 
shared this comment with the Spanish visitors, the compa-
ny was still three years away from putting into operation 
at the Dresden nuclear power plant (Illinois, Chicago)—
which it did in June 1960—the first of the three BWR 
reactors they had purchased from General Electric. This 
nuclear power plant was the first privately-funded plant 
in the United States to produce electricity on a large scale 
(Marcus, 2010, pp. 180 and 181).
The next stops Cortines and Albisu made, at the Cal-
ifornia facilities General Electric had in Vallecitos and 
San Jose, confirmed for them the idea that a BWR reactor 
from this firm could be one of the options to evaluate for 
the plant project. The reproduction in Vallecitos, on a 1/10 
scale, of the fuel elements used in Dresden and construc-
tion in the San Jose factory of a large water tank with 
identical dimensions to those of the reactor core were not 
only helpful for General Electric in doing hydraulic and 
thermal tests under real conditions, but were also useful in 
convincing potential buyers of the viability and reliability 
of their technology. In fact, the experience gained with the 
construction of this power plant was widely-used by Gen-
eral Electric later to give credibility to subsequent projects 
they used to compete in various tenders.
But the BWR reactors were not the only ones to grab 
the attention of the Spanish engineers. At the facility of 
Atomics International – a division of the North American 
Aviation company created to develop nuclear technolo-
gy – in Canoga Park, California, they learned the details 
of an experimental program, the Sodium Reactor Experi-
ment (SRE), with which this North American manufactur-
er wanted to check the technical and economic viability 
of reactors that were cooled by sodium and moderated by 
graphite. Although this experimental facility had been in 
operation for just three years, the results they had achieved 
so far had proved convincing: In November 1957, the time 
of the visit by the Spanish engineers, a reactor of this type 
was supplying electricity since July 12 of this same year 
to the California city of Santa Susana (Marcus, 2010, pp. 
146-149). While this was the first contact that engineers 
from the Spanish industry established with Atomics Inter-
national, we will see later that it was not the only one. The 
connection that was established with this facility from this 
moment on is another example of how this trip opened up 
routes and created relationships that not only later influ-
enced projects, but also marked policies that were useful 
for the Francoist State to get attention by forming part of 
the international atomic network. 
In addition to the General Electric and Atomics Inter-
national facilities, Cortines and Albisu also went to those 
that Westinghouse had in Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania). This 
was a company that was already prominent at the time 
for building PWR reactors; it had a 60 MWe one that was 
about to start up at the Shippingport nuclear power plant, 
which was inaugurated on December 18, 1957, in Beaver 
County (Pennsylvania) (Marcus, 2010: 156), and two oth-
ers under project: one for Pennsylvania Power & Light 
Company and another for the Yankee Rowe nuclear power 
plant that the Yankee Atomic Electric Company planned 
to build in Massachusetts. 
Nuclenor’s engineers knew from before they began 
their journey – the travel plan confirms this – that to catch 
up on reactor technology they had to contact, as we have 
seen, national laboratories, manufacturers, and North 
America’s private industry. But the various meetings they 
were having were showing them other possible interloc-
utors who were not in the initial plan, ones with influ-
ence and power in the building of this technology. Thus, 
contacting consulting companies specialized in reactor 
engineering and banks able to finance their project was 
of interest to them and took up as much, or more, time as 
the technology.
Therefore, one of the meetings that would most define 
the trip was the one they had with the nuclear physicist 
Walter Zinn. Obtaining his support would not only tech-
nically legitimize the Garoña project; his expert opinion 
would provide tools and procedures for the Nuclenor en-
gineers as well as the politicians in charge. The work he 
had developed in the Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) 
of the Manhattan Project and later with the construction 
of Chicago Pile-1,10 the first research nuclear reactor that 
had begun operating in 1942 at the University of Chicago 
(Marcus, 2010, pp. 20-22), distinguished him as an indis-
pensable advisor in the field of reactor physics as well as 
in the area of fuels. The experience of Walter Zinn, who 
had led the Argonne National Laboratory from 1946 to 
1956, where he had designed and built the Experimen-
tal Breeder Reactor (EBR) – the first nuclear reactor to 
produce electricity, in December 1951 (Marcus, 2010, pp. 
84 and 85) – combined two spaces, those of research and 
industry, which the Spaniards were interested in seeing 
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connected. In addition, this physicist had left the Argonne 
National Laboratory in 1956 to establish his own consult-
ing company, General Nuclear Engineering, in Florida. 
This other circumstance made it even more attractive to 
have him as an interlocutor.
In Spain in the 1950s, the brunt of research on atom-
ic matters was located and centralized in the JEN; that 
was why seeing the possibility of converting industrial 
spaces into research sites as well was so appealing to the 
Spanish engineers. This change, which would take place 
in Spain as of the mid-1960s with the launch of nuclear 
power plant projects, not only introduced new forms of 
relationships between the JEN and the electrical industry, 
but also modified policies—the Nuclear Energy Law of 
1964 is a good example of this—and shifted the research 
agenda from the JEN to the electric companies (Romero 
de Pablos, 2019b).
The meeting with Zinn took place on November 12, 
1957, in Washington. Cortines and Albisu shared with 
him the Spanish power plant project, verified their con-
fidence in the BWR reactors—his consulting firm had 
participated in the design and construction of several—
and secured his commitment as a possible consultant if 
the Spanish project moved forward. A commitment that 
in the end only materialized with the plant’s preliminary 
studies—specifically, he concerned himself with the work 
related to the search for a possible site—but which he did 
not want to extend to the construction stage. During this 
period, consultants would be hired such as INTERNU-
CLEAR, specialists like Walter Zinn’s consultancy in re-
actor physics, and others such as EBASCO, Gibbs & Hill 
and Bechtel, who shared extensive experience in nuclear 
power plant engineering.
The desirability of attracting and involving the North 
American political, economic, and financial powers in 
the Spanish project was also present in the various con-
versations the Nuclenor engineers held with the technol-
ogy manufacturers, as well as with executives from the 
consulting companies. Therefore, visiting the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission (US AEC) was anoth-
er priority on the trip. They did so almost near the end, 
accompanied by an executive from General Electric and 
José María de Areilza, Spain’s ambassador to Washington 
from 1954 to 1960. 
Areilza had a good dialogue going with the US AEC. 
He had experienced first-hand the circumstances in 
which President Eisenhower had launched the political 
program for research and nuclear development, ‘Atoms 
for Peace,’ and the development of what had been this 
program’s first success, the first Geneva Conference in 
1955. In addition, on July 19, 1955, as a representative 
of the Spanish government, he had signed with Admi-
ral Strauss, the President of the US AEC, the bilateral 
cooperation agreement on atomic energy.11 At the time 
of the visit of Gutiérrez-Cortines and Albisu on Novem-
ber 13, 1957, Areilza was just finalizing negotiations for 
the purchase of Jen 1, the first research reactor to be in-
stalled in Spain (Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, 
2001, pp. 127-135).
At the US AEC, Cortines and Albisu held a first meet-
ing with John A. Hall and Allen J. Vander Weyden, re-
spectively director and deputy director of the International 
Affairs Department of this organization. The cooperation 
of Vander Weyden in drafting the report from the “Three 
Wise Men” of Euratom not only provided guarantees and 
endorsed the opinions they might have about the Spanish 
project, which they found to be precise and realistic in 
regard to deadlines, but would also pave the way to ob-
tain permits from the Ministry of Industry.12 The second 
meeting was held with V. Packer and John P. Trevithick, 
European directors of the Reactor Development Depart-
ment of the US AEC. This second meeting was useful for 
the Spanish engineers to expand the information they had 
obtained on Argonaut-type research reactors at the begin-
ning of their trip on their visit to the Argonne National 
Laboratory. In addition to increasing the list of possible 
suitable manufacturers for this reactor type, at this meet-
ing they also learned that, just like the engineering fac-
ulties in Bilbao and Barcelona, Stanford University had 
among its plans to build this type of reactor. A fact they 
liked knowing because they thought it could help with 
possible support from the Spanish government for the in-
itiative from the Spanish faculties. These meetings at the 
US AEC were important; having the support of the US 
government agency that controlled and led the develop-
ment of atomic energy globally helped pave the way and 
accelerate Nuclenor’s plans in Spain. 
The discussions they held with representatives from 
the State Department, Chase Manhattan Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank, a bank created in 1934 to support, 
through financing, exports of US goods and services, put 
numbers on an agenda that had initially been designed to 
learn about reactor technologies and their potential manu-
facturers, contact specialized consultants, and obtain politi-
cal and financial support. The subject that focused the meet-
ings with the State Department’s nuclear energy advisers as 
well as with the banks was the high cost of nuclear-based 
electricity. Reports from the North Americans indicated 
the same thing as those made by the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry: the low economic profitability of nuclear-based 
energy. In this context, the Spaniards tried to convince the 
North Americans to act in two directions; on the one hand, 
facilitating the acquisition of foreign currency by Spanish 
companies and, on the other, encouraging a drop in prices 
of nuclear technology. The response from members of the 
US State Department was clear: as a trade-off, they asked 
the Spanish engineers to influence the Franco regime au-
thorities to modify legislation and facilitate the arrival on 
Spanish soil of foreign companies interested in investing. 
As I have already mentioned, the Stabilization Plan of 1959 
attempted to respond to this and other requests. 
III
The visits to General Electric, Westinghouse, and 
Atomics International not only convinced the two Span-
ish engineers of the capabilities and guarantees offered by 
these manufacturers with their technologies; the narrative 
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on these visits also later seduced the political and eco-
nomic powers within the dictatorship as to the viability of 
the Spanish nuclear project. 
Conversations, impressions, and secrets about nuclear 
technology were recorded in the travel log, as were pub-
lic and private organizations, electricity companies, and 
construction and consulting companies responsible for 
regulating, financing, building, and managing these tech-
nologies. The names of the Spaniards’ main interlocutors 
during their journey were also recorded. After analyzing 
this document from the perspective offered by the passage 
of time, I propose that this journey, along with the knowl-
edge, practices, and experiences it put into circulation, 
explains many of the decisions – political, economic, and 
technological – that marked and conditioned the nuclear 
projects that came later.
The connection that the Spanish engineers established 
with Atomics International was later taken advantage of 
by the JEN. In 1961 this agency, which remember had 
been created to lead nuclear research and development in 
Spain, would choose this company to develop the proto-
type for a small reactor having 20 MWe of power, known 
as the DON project; a reactor that would use natural ura-
nium as fuel, and be moderated by heavy water and cooled 
by an organic liquid. With its construction, the JEN want-
ed to study and plan the still incipient, at the time, Span-
ish nuclear program. The JEN physicists made many trips 
between 1961 and 1962 to the facilities at Atomics Inter-
national to experiment and learn about the physics of the 
reactor core. Reactors of this type were then being devel-
oped in Ispra (Italy), Canada (WR-1, in Whiteshell, Man-
itoba) and the United States (HWOCR). But despite the 
political and institutional support the project received and 
the notable collaborative effort also made by the Span-
ish industry, the reactor was never built (Caro, 1995, pp. 
99 and 121; Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, 2001, 
pp. 171 et seq.; Cerrolaza, 2002, p.11; Romero de Pablos, 
2019b, pp. 17 and 30).
Although there were technical reasons that justified 
interruption of the DON project, I would suggest this de-
cision can also be interpreted politically: it was a project 
that had been promoted under autarkic policies of the 
early Franco regime; abandoning it not only distanced 
the technocrats from these policies, but also indicated a 
willingness to take research power away from the JEN in 
favor of the industry. This would be confirmed, as we will 
see, in the Law on Nuclear Energy of 1964. 
The relationships established with Westinghouse and 
General Electric indeed lasted longer. Westinghouse was 
the manufacturer of the first power reactor to be put into 
operation in Spain at the Zorita nuclear power plant (Gua-
dalajara) in 1969; and General Electric manufactured the 
second in Garoña (Burgos) in 1971. Both manufacturers 
would become the main suppliers of nuclear technology 
in Spain. (For a complete list of the nuclear projects that 
were planned in Spain from 1959 to the present see Rubio 
Varas and De la Torre, 2017, pp. 249-254).
General Nuclear Engineering, INTERNUCLEAR, 
EBASCO, Gibbs & Hill and Bechtel, the consultants Cor-
tines and Albisu contacted during their trip, would later, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, become the main advisers and 
interlocutors for the Spanish electricity companies. The 
practices they introduced, almost all of them unheard of in 
Spain at the time – one example, tenders to purchase tech-
nologies – legitimized and provided guarantees for or-
ganizational and management procedures without which 
it would have been difficult to build the Spanish nuclear 
facilities. The services offered by these consultants, based 
on knowledge and experience, influenced and reshaped 
Spanish companies mainly through the establishment of 
subsidiaries and alliances with local companies. One ex-
ample of these alliances was the Empresarios Agrupados 
consortium that was created in 1971 following an agree-
ment of Gibbs & Hill with the subsidiaries of Banco Ur-
quijo, Técnicas Reunidas and Estudios y Proyectos Técni-
cos Industriales S.A. (EPTISA). The economic historian 
Adoración Álvaro Moya considers that it was precisely 
the integration of this knowledge and its application to the 
organizational capabilities of Spanish engineering com-
panies that allowed them to later compete successfully in 
international markets (Álvaro Moya, 2014, pp. 686-702). 
Likewise, the request made by the representative of 
the US State Department to Gutiérrez-Cortines concern-
ing introducing potential legislative changes that would 
favor the arrival of foreign companies on Spanish soil had 
its effect, giving nuclear technology an active role in the 
progressive process of economic liberalization that began 
in the 1960s in Spain. That is, international pressure, on 
the one hand, and pressure from the Spanish electrical in-
dustry, on the other, led to an opening in the markets that 
positively influenced the exploitation of nuclear electrical 
energy (Garrués-Irurzun and Rubio Mondéjar, 2017, pp. 
67-96). This exploitation would not have been possible 
without clear reciprocal instrumentalization between po-
litical, economic, and industrial interests (Garrués-Iru-
rzun and Rubio Mondéjar, 2018, pp. 12-15) nor without 
the financing the Franco government and Spanish electri-
cal industry received from North American banks. 
I already mentioned that the United States government 
had created the Eximbank in 1934 precisely to support 
exports of US products and services. This tool, which 
was used to protect and promote its nuclear technology 
through lending, was also useful for the North Amer-
icans to control and influence electricity sector policies 
and strategies in other countries. The Spanish case is very 
clear in this regard, but it was not the only one (on how the 
purchase of nuclear reactors for Zorita and Garoña was 
negotiated see Romero de Pablos, 2019b, pp. 42-51 and 
77-87; on their financing see Rubio Varas and De la Torre, 
2017, p. 127). A detailed study of Eximbank’s movements 
shows that loans from the United States were behind the 
financing of more than half of the nuclear reactor sales 
that took place in the Western world between 1955 and 
1985. This circumstance explains the predominance of 
North American nuclear technology facilities in the West 
(Rubio Varas and De la Torre, 2017, p. 124). 
These strategies were also adopted by private Span-
ish banks, who knew how to take advantage of limitations 
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in the Spanish financial system. If collaboration between 
the State and electricity companies was necessary, and its 
counterpart was that their interests would predominate in 
the design of the Spanish nuclear program (Garrués-Iru-
rzun and Rubio Mondéjar, 2018, pp. 15-17), no less im-
portant was the influence on these electricity companies 
from the private Spanish banks, who also took care to 
establish a model for nuclear development that was fa-
vorable to their interests. For example, Nuclenor, in order 
to build the Garoña nuclear power plant, had to resort to 
a consortium made up of the five most important Span-
ish private banks (Bilbao, Vizcaya, Santander, Español de 
Crédito and Central), banks with which both Iberduero 
and Electra del Viesgo had historically been linked (Ru-
bio Varas and De la Torre, 2017, p. 129). Nuclear invest-
ment, while strengthening relations between electricity 
companies and financial power, also strengthened bank-
ing corporations who had a bearing on decisions from 
the Spanish electricity sector (Garrués-Irurzun and Ru-
bio-Mondéjar, 2017, pp. 78-87).
Finally, the arrival of nuclear technology and, along 
with it, North American consultants and investments, also 
influenced the Spanish policies that regulated it. Many of 
the presumptions contained in the Law on Nuclear Energy 
of 1964, which established the legal system for the devel-
opment and implementation of peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy, are difficult to understand without the new 
context that opened up in Spain after this trip in 1957.13 
This law, which sought to impose order and control on 
this new form of energy, showcased a new scenario that 
was a reflection of the development and industrial mo-
mentum that stimulated construction of Spanish nuclear 
facilities. 
The set of rules collected in the law reaffirmed, on 
the one hand, the JEN as a leading research center and 
as a regulatory body of the State; but it also gave Spanish 
electricity companies power over nuclear development 
that up to then they had not had. From then on, the JEN 
saw its realm of influence diminished and had to come to 
agreement with the electricity companies on many of the 
decisions that, until then, it had made alone. The weight 
of the international connection on nuclear development 
in Spain was also incorporated into the 1964 law. For the 
first time, it considered regulating and controlling inter-
national commitments the Spanish State had already ac-
quired or had in mind to take on in nuclear matters. The 
close connection that had been established with the North 
American State and its industry, which would later also 
extend to France (Vandellòs) and Germany (Trillo), re-
quired regulation that until then had been absent, as it 
was considered unnecessary, from the Spanish legislative 
body.
IV
Recorded in this travel log, and in how it was narrated, 
were ways of experimenting, acquiring knowledge, de-
signing and promoting research, regulating and financing 
it, and also ways of building power. 
The artifacts, books, and materials that traveled from 
one side of the Atlantic to the other, along with nuclear 
technicians and experts, politicians and diplomats, tech-
nology manufacturers and expert consultants, while par-
ticipating in the construction of North American scientific 
hegemony, also contributed to creating a new narrative of 
the Franco regime that showed Spain as a modern, inter-
nationally-connected State with technical capacity and 
political and business leadership capable of incorporating 
the latest atomic technologies. 
Cortines and Albisu opened up a route that others 
would later travel once again. A route that allowed Spain 
to enter into international nuclear energy networks and 
internally present itself as a modern and capable country. 
On this first trip, both engineers confirmed that experi-
mentation does not only take place in laboratories but also 
outside of them, and they established new ways of organ-
izing, managing, and financing research spaces, whether 
public or private. And while always thinking of its appli-
cation in a unique land like Spain in the second half of 
the 1950s, determined to assert its scientific and technical 
capabilities in a political context that was authoritarian 
and centralized.
This trip incorporated a series of state-of-the-art in-
struments into Spanish science and technology that, be-
yond being useful to start-up the Garoña nuclear power 
plant, contributed experiences and tools that reinforced 
the powers of the Franco dictatorship, the electricity com-
panies and the engineers in an alliance that announced the 
technocratic Spain of the 1960s and early 1970s.
The consequences of this 1957 trip on the reconfig-
uration of how Spanish energy was mapped puts into 
question discourses, at least in the case of nuclear en-
ergy, that have argued that scientific and technological 
research played a secondary role in the political and 
economic changes that were initiated in Spain as of the 
Stabilization Plan of 1959. This trip showed and out-
lined itineraries that would be frequently repeated later, 
noted interlocutors with whom solid research links were 
established, introduced new experimental practices for 
organization and management within and outside labo-
ratories and industrial facilities, and established guide-
lines and strategies that would design the agendas of the 
electricity companies and the scientific, economic, and 
industrial policies that made the Spanish nuclear facil-
ities possible.
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NOTES
1  Travel log by Mr. Cortines, who travelled to the US and Cana-
da accompanied by Mr. Albisu. Bilbao, December 1957. Archivo 
Garoña.
2  A previous trip took Irish-born industrial engineer Jaime Mac‐
Veigh Alfós to the United States between 1948 and 1950. Al-
though this originated in Banco Urquijo’s interest in studying 
the start-up of the TALGO (Tren Articulado Ligero Goicoechea 
Oriol, an articulated light rail), the attention Mac‐Veigh saw in 
the North American industry to apply the energy produced by the 
fission of uranium to obtain electrical energy gave him arguments 
that convinced the directors of the largest Spanish industrial bank 
of the possibilities that this new source of energy could have in 
Spain. This trip was the origin of the first study that was done on 
a possible Spanish nuclear program (Mac‐Veigh, 1957) and of 
Tecnatom (Técnicas Atómicas, S.A.), a nuclear engineering firm 
that Banco Urquijo created in April 1957 to consider construction 
of Zorita, the first nuclear power plant that was connected to Red 
Eléctrica (the electrical network) in Spain (De la Torre, 2017, pp. 
41‐42; Rubio Varas and De la Torre, 2018). 
3  Radioactive minerals. Law of 17 July 1958 amending section (b) 
of the second article of the Decree-Law of 22 October 1951 and 
laying down rules for their investigation and exploitation. Boletín 
Oficial del Estado (BOE, Official State Gazette) of 18 July 1958, 
171, pp. 1274-1275.
4  The Nuclear Energy Board (JEN) was the public research body 
created in 1951 by the Franco regime to control, promote and 
direct the development of nuclear energy in Spain. Decree Law of 
22 October 1951. BOE from 24 October 1951, pp. 4778 – 4779.
5  In 1964, Francisco Albisu was the first Professor of Nuclear 
Technology in Spain and taught at the Faculty of Industrial Engi-
neers in Bilbao.
6  This report was part of a library donated to Spain by the United 
States government in 1955 as a response, and in gratitude for, 
signing the Treaty on Nuclear Cooperation between the two coun-
tries. For this library’s history and its role in the construction of 
North American scientific hegemony as of 1945 see Romero de 
Pablos (2018b).
7  Travel log by Mr. Cortines, who travelled to the US and Cana-
da accompanied by Mr. Albisu. Bilbao, December 1957. Archivo 
Garoña, p. 5.
8  The Atomic Industrial Forum was the first industry association 
formed in 1953 for the purpose of promoting applications of nu-
clear technology. This association worked with the industry and 
the US government on policy development on nuclear issues and 
has played an important role in forming public opinion about 
nuclear energy. This association was the model for the Span-
ish Atomic Forum created in Spain in 1963. To learn about the 
role it played in legitimizing nuclear energy in Spain see Sán-
chez-Vázquez (2010) and Sánchez-Vázquez and Menéndez-Na-
varro (2015).
9  Travel log by Mr. Cortines, who travelled to the US and Cana-
da accompanied by Mr. Albisu. Bilbao, December 1957. Archivo 
Garoña, p. 8.
10 The word pile was used to describe these early assemblies; the 
word reactor had not yet been applied.
11 Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish government and 
the government of the United States of America on civilian uses 
of atomic energy. Washington, July 19, 1955. Archivo Ministerio 
de Asuntos Exteriores.
12 This report—A Target for EURATOM—which was made by 
Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordini, originated in 
the desire of the governments from Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
to know the amount of atomic energy that each of them could 
produce and to estimate the means they would have to use to do 
so. The full report is available at https://core.ac.uk/download/
pdf/7434607.pdf
13 Law 25/1964 on Nuclear Energy. BOE of 4 May 1964, 107, p. 
7544.
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